Back To The Future Of War
The principles of war in today’s (and yesterday’s) conflicts
by John Sponauer
(Address altered to prevent spam...please correct in your email 'To' field before sending)
February, 2005
 

Author's Note:   In February 2005, the following essay was submitted into the "Principles of War" essay contest sponsored by a range of defense establishment organizations, including the U.S. Naval Institute, Johns Hopkins University, Royal United Services Institute, National Defense University, Army War College, Air War College, Naval War College, Office of Force Transformation, and the Department of Defense.  

Because the contest was open to the general public as well, and offered $35,000 in prizes, participation was very high; more than 800 essays were received.   Participants in the contest were challenged to answer the following in 3,500 words or less.

""Have the traditional principles of war changed? How are they changing?

Leaders at the highest levels now speak of a "new kind of war." Even before 9/11, President George W. Bush challenged the armed services to "redefine war in our terms" in response to the conflicts of a new century. Yet, a debate on the Principles of War, as they are understood today, is absent.  This deficiency skews the content of public policy and budget discussions just as it hampers the crafting of warfare doctrine for joint and coalition operations. Dare to write an essay for this contest."

While I am of course disappointed that I did not win, I am honored to have had the opportunity to submit a paper to the key players in shaping this nation's defense policy.   I hope the essay is an enjoyable to read as it was to write, and I welcome any comments at the email address above.  My thanks go to my team of volunteer editors, whose broad experience in military affairs and history on the ground, in the air, and on (and under) the seas helped make the essay much better.

Information about the contest, and the list of winners, is available at www.usni.org

Contents

• Introduction

• American War

• Principles for 'The Gap'

• In Defense of the 'Big War' Military

• Technologies Haven't Changed the Principles

• Conclusion

INTRODUCTION

Just weeks into his presidency, George W. Bush staked his ground in the perpetual debate about America’s military future. 

“...we must extend our peace by advancing our technology.  We're witnessing a revolution in the technology of war, powers increasingly defined not by size, but by mobility and swiftness.  Advantage increasingly comes from information...  Safety is gained in stealth and forces projected on the long arc of precision-guided weapons.  The best way to keep the peace is to redefine war on our terms.” [i] 

Within seven months, the Twin Towers were destroyed, the Pentagon was on fire, and more than 3,000 Americans lay dead.  The peace to ‘extend’ was imaginary.

America has since launched two major combat operations, applying nearly the full range of her military within them.  From horse-bound special operators guiding airstrikes to division-sized armored offensives, from close-range urban fights to around-the-clock strikes by naval and aerial weapons of global reach, there seems to be no limit to US military capability.  For all of the recent talk of “transforming” the US military into a more flexible force, there’s abundant evidence that it’s largely there, at least in capability.

Within this variety of action, however, America’s military is still driven by principles of conventional warfare established in the 19^th century by Prussian Carl von Clausewitz; all US military services refer to and cite them in doctrinal documents.   These principles - Mass, Objective, Offensive, Surprise, Economy of Force, Movement, Unity of Command, Security, and Simplicity – are easily-defined, broad, and as demonstratively relevant in today’s conventional war as in Clausewitz’s era.

However, the American military is operating in a vastly different world than Clausewitz was; indeed, even from the one envisioned a decade ago.  Without a global rival now or on the near horizon, America faces a likely military reality not of conventional forces sweeping across continents in total war, but instead a strategic equivalent of what the US Marine Corps calls the ‘three block war;’ armed conflict on the city block ahead, with reconstruction and redevelopment on the two behind.[ii]  To prepare for this world and also keep a necessary contingency for conventional wars, America’s military must continue to draw from Clausewitz’s principles of conventional war, but also adapt them into a larger framework for the types of conflict actually more common today and in the future.  They are a far cry from the conventional warfare the military was built for, but America should heed the danger of “preparing for the war we want to fight…not for the conflicts we cannot avoid,” as military analyst Ralph Peters writes.[iii]

 These conflicts are categorized broadly as ‘operations other than war,’ ‘low intensity conflict,’ ‘fourth generation warfare,’ or other phrases that reveal an institutional lack of clarity.  It’s an environment usually bereft of familiar society, technology, and structure, where warfare often remains little changed from pre-industrial eras.  It’s here that the future of American ‘war’ lays, and a glimpse at history reveals that it should be familiar ground indeed for America’s warriors.

AMERICAN WAR

While President Bush was certainly not being literal in his call to redefine war, the exercise is useful.   It's time to move past misconceptions of war that have clouded military planning since 1945.

America has not been limited by constitutionally established constraints on ‘war.’   She has not declared war in more than 60 years, the longest peacetime in her history, although Americans have shot and been shot at in dozens of locales during that period.  There’s not been a dedicated large-scale public mobilization, literally or in spirit, since 1945.  During Vietnam, when America saw its largest ever draft-age population, barely one-third of era veterans were conscripted, compared to nearly 70 percent in WWII.[iv]   

Aside from economic and societal side effects of these conflicts, the vast majority of today’s Americans have been personally unaffected by the battles fought in their name.  Total war has not been experienced for generations, and within a decade, nearly all with personal memories of it will be gone.  In the meantime, America has changed, as have expectations for how it fights.   Today’s American society would be hard-pressed to condone destruction or losses routine in our last declared war.   A repeat of the American firebombing of Tokyo, with 100,000 civilians purposely killed overnight, would be unlikely today and into the foreseeable future, although technologically possible in spades.  Even the use of the word ‘war’ has been eroded, now also describing programs addressing poverty and drugs. What have been fought since 1945 were not traditional wars, but limited actions fitting each era’s political needs.  During the Cold War, these fights were usually tied into that larger ideological conflict.  In the decade between the Soviet collapse and 9/11, American military force was mostly used to stabilize unstable regions.  If there was any consistent rationale offered for operations in Haiti, Africa, and the Balkans, it was to ‘do something.’   Post-9/11 conflicts under a ‘global war on terror’ have largely been to change the social, political, and military dynamics of the Middle East.

More hopeful visionaries such as Dr. Thomas P.M. Barnett describe today’s desired strategic outcome as moving socially and economically ‘disconnected’ regions of the world from ‘the Gap’ to ‘the Core,’ the functioning players in the global economy and community.[v]   More pessimistic visionaries would call it a clash of civilizations.  Virtually all see the world split into groups of nations, ranging from affluent developed states to countries-in-name-only existing in a nightmarish ‘Mad Max’ world.  Whether or not one accepts his Core / Gap premise, or believes that it should be the military’s constitutional mission to perform this ‘reconnection,’ Barnett correctly reveals that nearly all post-war American combat actions have occurred in the Gap.[vi]   Therefore, if present and future American ‘war’ is defined by the use of force since 1945, it most accurately means combat for limited political purposes, in defense of America’s values or positioning overseas, usually in the disconnected regions of the world.

PRINCIPLES FOR ‘THE GAP’

Once the notion of total war is removed from the likely probabilities of future conflict, it becomes necessary to examine how America fights these ‘small wars.’[vii]  If one accepts the words of Barnett, Peters, and military leaders like Gen. Anthony Zinni, USMC (Ret.),[viii] there is a vast portion of the undeveloped world that will continue to disproportionably draw American attention.  Conflicts here will not necessarily include large conventional battles, clearly defined goals, or even specific short-term outcomes.  

 While these notions would seem to be antithesis for a military giant like America or its “Powell Doctrine” of overwhelming conventional force, US soldiers have been tasked with this mission in every decade since the 1840s, if not earlier.  In the 1990s, it was not uncommon for ten or more of these operations occurring at one time.[ix]  Were America to fund its military solely on the basis of past usage, it would largely be a ‘small wars’ force.  This is clearly not new ground….in fact, the basics can be found in the 1940 ‘Small Wars Manual’ published by the US Marine Corps, building on experience from the decades prior in Central America.[x]   Comparing its lessons to those today on the streets of Iraq or Afghanistan shows either tremendous premonition or the somewhat universal nature of ‘small wars’ through time; it’s unsurprising that Barnett identifies the Marines as key players today in ‘connecting’ the Gap to the Core. [xi]  

Connecting the Gap requires envisioning and creating a future of lasting system change there, and a new set of principles of operation are needed for military forces to participate in, and more importantly, lead that change.   The beauty of Clausewitz’s principles for conventional warfare is their breadth, which allows for broad interpretation and application.   Similarly, those attempting to define principles for ‘small wars’ should be wary not to micro-analyze minor ideas into large concepts.  Because ‘small wars’ are framed by unique circumstances and depth, those seeking to operate in them need flexibility with planning and application, using a new set of principles valid in nearly all types of similar conflict.

• FORCE is the first and most visible of these new principles, and in the context of fighting a ‘small war’ encompasses all of Clausewitz’s principles of conventional warfare into one.   An unpleasant reality is that for much of the world, the rule of the gun remains.   Once bullets start to fly, combat reveals Clausewitz’s principles to be relevant, and in fact, even the Small Wars Manual cites them.[xii]   Firepower often rules the day, and conventional weapons, especially today’s precision-guided munitions, are often just as valuable in this ‘small wars’ fight as when used against conventional forces.   This does not mean that a level of violence acceptable in conventional war is acceptable here, but the bottom line is that progress often requires bad people to die.   Clausewitz’s principles of conventional war allow that killing to be more efficient and effective, even in a ‘small wars’ environment.  
  

• LEVERAGE OF NON-FORCE ASSETS.   The ‘small war’ is not won by combat alone, but by leveraging assets locally and strategically to meet goals.   Locally, this can range from utilizing local religious or community leaders in redevelopment to paying locals outright for services.   It can involve coordinating the actions of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO’s), or training a constabulary to assist in security functions.   Leveraging can mean public information efforts to disseminate information and combat propaganda; in this rapidly communicating world, ‘message’ is nearly large enough to be a principle itself.   The mass media and its related technology are tremendous factors in modern military operations, and the public’s will to support them.  It’s leverage of the media and information capacity that improves the literal connectedness of a society, and it’s leverage of knowledge that helps rob terrorists of intellectual and emotional breeding grounds.  In a larger sense, leverage links the military and civilian worlds, both within the local region and across societies….it unleashes the power of the world into the most undeveloped regions.  Barnett describes a ‘Sys-Admin’ force comprised of older, diverse, experts working in or with focused military units, such as those tasked with civil affairs and psychological operations.[xiii]   Even if one disavows his notion, it is clear that for success in the Gap, the solution lays far beyond simply killing.
  

• CULTURAL AWARENESS may create negative association to the soft world of civilian multiculturalism, but if Americans are to succeed in foreign environments, they should understand and work with local traditions and cultures.   US Army Special Forces have operated in this mindset for decades with great success, and conventional units have had to adapt to it also when fighting America’s traditional ‘small wars’ enemy, the guerilla.  Training has begun to shift towards it already, even in the most conventional of units.[xiv]   As the Small Wars Manual outlines, forces working in a ‘small war’ environment need to associate with local civilians, respect their politics and religion, and work in partnership.[xv]   Cultural Awareness should permeate all ranks of the ‘small wars’ force to better understand and operate within the historical and social context of the situation.
  

• UNITY OF PURPOSE.   The US Marine Corps defines Clausewitz’s principle of ‘unity of command’ as the “designation of a single commander with the authority to direct and coordinate the efforts of all assigned forces in pursuit of a common objective.”[xvi]   In the ‘small war’ scenario, situations often may not allow for ‘assigning of forces’ strictly in the sense of military units.   General Zinni, for instance, likened the role of coordinating with vital NGO's in Somalia to ‘herding cats.’[xvii]   This institutional divergence was amplified by the civilians' often-dim view of military operations, and mutual sentiments across the table.   However, even with different philosophy and operations, a unity of purpose in each situation must be realized if efficient improvement is possible.  If America desires a role for its military beyond destruction, it should embrace the services’ ability to coordinate a unity of purpose wherever it operates.   Indeed, there are few other bodies that efficiently could.   A sign that the military understands this need within its own ranks is the strong structure set in place with regional CINCs.   Their budget growth and influence since the start of the 1990s[xviii] have helped a great deal to facilitate coordination between the US military and regional groups and states.

IN DEFENSE OF THE ‘BIG WAR’ MILITARY

With few exceptions, forces designed for a conventional fight on land, on (or under) the seas, or in the air are still relevant and needed in the ‘small war’ mission.  Even futurist Barnett sees what he calls a ‘Leviathan’ force doing the eternal military role of killing people and breaking things.[xix]   Carrier Battle Groups designed to project force in the Cold War are often as useful during a time of ‘small wars’ as centers of force, logistics, command, and support…perhaps their design isn’t ideal, but it works now (as recently evidenced by their deployment in Asia’s 2004 tsunami aid relief effort) and will for decades.   Similarly, while America's submarines don’t face similar competition as in the Cold War, the need for stealthy naval strike and intelligence continues.    On the ground, armored forces are still highly valued, as the tough urban fights in Iraq have demonstrated clearly.[xx]  Air combat technology allows for the global reach and precision attack that nearly any modern combat requires.  Even the Small Wars Manual, written in the dawn of airpower’s growth as a strategic power, states “the primary mission of combat aviation in a small war is the direct support of the ground forces.” [xxi] 

Aside from these procurement issues, there is still a need for big war strategy, in which Clausewitz’s principles are as valid and useful as ever.   History has shown that micro-versions of the big war, like Operation Desert Storm, have been historically common enough to plan for and fund, and in any case, they often are needed first before a ‘small war’-based reconnection can proceed.   

America is affluent enough to fund such a dual purpose military…today’s defense spending accounts for a historically tiny 3 percent of America’s GDP,[xxii] and the size of the US Army alone is still approximately 30% less than its 1980s, all-volunteer level of 780,000.[xxiii]

TECHNOLOGIES HAVEN'T CHANGED THE PRINCIPLES

When focusing on the need to plan for a conventional threat, it is tempting to seek to change Clausewitz’s principles of conventional war to account for modern technology.   With billions of dollars, thousands of careers, and decades of work put into these efforts, there is also great pressure to do so.   While many of these technologies are exciting and full of potential for making conflicts shorter and less costly, for all their advantages they do not by themselves change the principles of conventional war.  A close look at several reveals that they rather easily fit into the existing set of principles. 

• PRECISION ATTACK.   If there is a trademark modern American weapon, surely it’s the ‘smart bomb.’   Accompanying it are a litany of guided munitions, ranging from smaller anti-tank missiles with a range of a few miles to cruise missiles able to cross continents and hit within feet of specific points.  On the surface, there are strong arguments that these Precision-Guided Munitions (PGMs) alter the principle of ‘mass,’ with an example being the efficiency of modern guided aerial bombs, in effect giving each bomb (sometimes carried by the dozen on one aircraft) an accuracy often unobtainable by formations of WWII-era bombers.   The use of PGM’s has even spawned an ability, used by Israeli helicopter gunships, among others, to selectively target individual members of terrorist groups[xxiv]….how far we’ve come from the days of WWII’s 1,000-bomber raids, a clear illustration of ‘mass’ if there ever was one.  However, mass isn’t solely about numbers as it is about the right number in the right place at the right time, or as the USAF describes, to “concentrate the effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time to achieve decisive results.”[xxv]  In context, a single B-2 bomber crew of two can constitute mass as easily as one twelve-man special forces team, or an armored division of 12,000.   If one examines the principle of mass in this light, nothing has changed with the advent of precision attack. 
  

• INCREASED FIREPOWER, AT LOWER LEVELS.   At its most basic level, combat comes down to individual warriors killing each other, often in intimately personal, violent manners.   Despite leaps of technology, much of the combat life of an American infantryman in 2005 is still a rough, Hobbesian existence, somewhat unchanged from the classical period.   A striking difference, however, is the offensive and defensive capability of today’s weapons.   Perhaps taken for granted, this difference has greatly shaped warfare, allowing for efficient slaughter and destruction.  A modern combat rifle, issued to nearly every soldier, can accurately kill at ranges equal to some artillery of the Napoleonic era.   The firepower difference between traditionally ‘heavy’ units like armor and ‘light’ units like infantry has been degraded, although not equalized, by man-portable PGM’s which allow individuals to destroy armored vehicles and aircraft at range.  On the seas, compact, self-guided weapons carried by small craft or aircraft can destroy much larger vessels.   Their threat and proliferation has changed the risk calculus of operating large capital ships close to an enemy, even those without a sizable navy.  However, even with these advances, what is firepower but the existing principle of 'economy of force?'   Have more powerful weapons changed combat tactics?   Undoubtedly.   Have they altered the basic principles?   The answer is largely no.
  

• INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY.   Advances in computing power have reaped enormous military benefits.  Virtually every service, and every specialty within every service, is more automated and connected than ever, and some tasks have been replaced by technology.  Meanwhile, these advances are shaping the modern battlefield, including systems that plot friendly and enemy forces, and unmanned vehicles for scouting and strike.   “Network-Centric” is one of many buzzwords that support a military that is interconnected, less platform-specific, and better coordinated.   However, the advantages offered by these systems simply enhance the existing principles of ‘unity of command,’ ‘surprise,’ ‘economy of force,’ ‘maneuver,’ and ‘mass.’
  

• JOINTNESS.  Through mandate of Congress and realpolitik recognition of the need for cooperation, America’s military is more ‘joint’ than ever.  From positioning Army helicopters on Navy aircraft carriers off of Haiti, to the creation of the Joint Special Operations Command, essentially a separate branch of the services coordinating assets from each, America’s military is increasingly seamless.  At the end of the day, however, has this jointness moved the ball beyond ‘unity of command’ into a new principle?  It’s hard to see how.
  

• SPEED AND SIMULTANEITY.  “Speed Kills” could well have been the unofficial slogan of Operation Iraqi Freedom.  The allied offensive to Baghdad was a model for simultaneity, maneuver, and the killing power of America's military.   Combined with a weak Iraqi strategy, the drive left the enemy stunned and outclassed.   A consistent theme echoed in American commanders’ journals was the decision to operate inside the Iraqi decision-making cycle; a clear example was the armored “Thunder Run” into the heart of Baghdad, as Iraq’s regime was claiming American forces were nowhere near the city.[xxvi]   The speed of OIF was impressive, but was it any more than the principles of ‘surprise,’ ’maneuver,’ and ‘mass’ in action, driven by modern technology?

CONCLUSION

While he couldn’t have foreseen it on that February day nearly four years ago, President Bush was speaking to a military about to be charged with its most ambitious battle plans in decades.  It has performed that duty very well as a whole, especially in conventional battle when it has relied on doctrine rooted in Clausewitz’s principles.   However, only part of the fight today remains conventional in nature, and it is in this other gray area that the US military must lead and adapt to persevere.  It cannot do that by solely relying on the high technology and lofty visions of ‘big war’ transformation, but rather in the messy, long-proven strategies for fighting conflicts where the ultimate outcome isn’t the total destruction of a nation, but rather the building up of a better society.

Creating a worldview based on conventional warfighting capability, instead of creating a warfighting capability based on the actual world, is a dangerous folly, and far too costly a mistake to make.   America owes its warriors the lessons of conventional war that have withstood the test of time, and also apply them to the world they are actually living and fighting in today and tomorrow.   That world will less resemble the fields of battle from Clausewitz’s era, but rather the messy world of a global system coming together economically and socially.  Bush’s call to ‘keep the peace’ in this world will require America to view its past lessons, apply the proven principles of war to conventional battle when it occurs, and frame out a new operating order for the non-conventional conflicts most likely in the future.

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