John Sponauer - Close Air Support in WWII: The Luftwaffe

Originally Published April 24, 2000 at

All images below are thumbnails only; Full versions may been seen in the SimHQ article linked above.

This is the second part of a series of SimHQ.com articles on the role of close air support in modern war. For the previous installment, be sure to read Andy Bush's excellent "Close Air Support in the Vietnam War."

The idea of writing a series of articles on CAS came out of some internal discussions back in October of 1999. In one day, we exchanged about 30 emails back and forth, and quickly chose "assignments" for CAS stories to cover. As you may guess, talking about writing these articles and actually doing it are two different things...I was amazed at how much I didn't know about the topic until I started reading about it, and this article has been a real joy to write (in some ways ;) ). I hope I do the topic justice.

Before the reader delves into the article, there are several points of clarification that I'd like to make, just to avoid confusion later.

Thanks for visiting SimHQ.com and for reading "Close Air Support in World War II: The Luftwaffe." Feedback is always appreciated!

It's hard to believe that a little more than five years prior to the invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, the Luftwaffe didn't even exist. Disarmed by the conditions of surrender of the First World War, Germany was banned from having a standing air force. While organizationally it prevented the Luftwaffe of WWII from being formed early, the ban was widely ignored in spirit. Numerous state-sponsored "flying clubs" blossomed all over the country, many air officers from WWI were placed high in the German Army structure, and the German aircraft industry, banned from building warplanes for Germany, moved some operations oversees and produced aircraft under contract for other nations.

The fact that the Germans saw the potential of airpower in a CAS role is important for understanding the success of the airpower component of what western observers called Blitzkrieg. Unlike most other countries in the inter-war years, Germany saw a close connection between its air force and army, not just on paper, but in tactics. As the Luftwaffe came into its own in 1934, most of the higher officers in the Luftwaffe were formerly of the German Army. Even new recruits to the Luftwaffe officer corps were given valuable training in army tactics and concepts. The two branches frequently held officer exchanges during annual exercises, and to a degree unlike any other nation, the Luftwaffe was seen as a supporting peer to the Army, as well as the other way around. As Germany's enemies would find once they were on the receiving end of the Blitzkrieg, this coordination, from the highest echelons down to combat units, greatly enhanced their military effectiveness. Despite some early, and even some lingering, feeling of distrust of their new airborne counterparts (incidentally, many of those same German military leaders also distrusted the armor corps), the German Army not only expected, but demanded, that the Luftwaffe support them in war. While the Luftwaffe was not instantly wed to the actions that we would consider close air support today (preferring instead to initially focus on actions in the enemy's rear...what we would consider interdiction today), several of the Luftwaffe's most progressive military minds had their own theories.

To make these theories work, the Germans needed a practical testing ground for testing air / ground coordination. They got it, in the form of the Spanish Civil War.

A Kette of Ju-87s over Spain.
Source: The Encyclopedia of Weapons of World War II

The baptism of fire for the Luftwaffe and their new concepts of air / ground cooperation came in Spain. In November 1936, Germany had 40 aircraft and more than 4,000 "voluntary" personnel in the theater, fighting on the Nationalist side as the Legion Condor. This number would eventually move upwards of 10,000 men.

The leaders of the fledgling Luftwaffe used Spain as the testing ground for doctrine, and for the most part came away with correct theory that would prove instrumental over Poland and France in the years to come.

One leader in particular, Oberst Wolfram von Richthofen (the cousin of WWI's "Red Baron") played a crucial role not only in developing the tactics of close air support, but also the tools to make it all work. Originally the Chief of Staff of General Hugo Sperrle, von Richthofen took over as commander of the Legion Condor in 1938. Prior to that, Richthofen cut his teeth turning years of theory of "peacetime" army/air force cooperation into practice.

Richthofen's fame came largely later in France and Poland, and ironically, while he is often credited with the development of dive bombing tactics for the Ju87 Stuka, he was not an early proponent of the aircraft. While there was never a doubt of whether the Luftwaffe would support the army or not, Richthofen's original preference was on the status quo theory of effective strikes, low-level strafing and bombing using He51 and Hs123 fighters and coordinated by liaison teams in the German Army.

Special Luftwaffe radio teams, attached to army commanders, could accurately direct ground support where it was needed. This by itself was revolutionary; with the added force of some new German weapons, the first large-scale lesson in close air support was about to begin.

In September 1937, the Junkers Ju87A Stuka was introduced to the Spanish Civil War as part of the aircraft's operational trials. Three Ju87s from I/St.G 163 were sent to Spain, and aircrews quickly grew to appreciate the dive bomber's abilities. It was rugged, stable, and easy to fly. Luftwaffe aircrews were rotated through the Stuka unit to give them combat experience in the airframe and provide a pool of skilled operators for when the type went into widespread use. The Germans prized the Ju87s so much that not even their Nationalist allies were allowed to examine them, and it became a great fear that one of these "wonder weapons" would fall into the hands of the enemy.

Approaching its target at a near vertical dive, the Stuka was capable of placing its 1,000 lb. payload with then-pinpoint accuracy. A pair of machine guns rounded out the armament. After its first combat use in March 1938, aircrews bragged of being able to deliver bombs within five meters of the target, more than close enough for the bomb to cause significant damage. Aviation historian Walter Boyne has called the Stuka "the first smart bomb" for its ability to strike at pinpoint targets, far more accurately than conventional low-level bombing.

The initial success of the Stuka was not lost on von Richthofen, who began to strongly push for more coordination between Stuka crews and the army forces below. This was a marked change from earlier in the conflict, when he was reluctant to use the new aircraft.

In one instance, the Germans launched a bombing raid on a road bridge near Guernica. More than 40 level bombers and fighters were tasked to take out the target. A 1948 British study of the action came to this conclusion:

"He had at his disposal a weapons far more suited to the task than the cumbersome Junkers (Ju52 level bomber). Each of his Stuka dive bombers was capable of carrying a single bomb weighing 1,000 pounds. Equipped the latest bombsight, able to nose-dive onto a target, and any of the four Stuka available that day would have had a high chance of taking out the bridge with one direct hit."

von Richthofen apparently never considered employing the brand new Stukas for the attack. As their worth and accuracy became more evident, they were used much more, which also strengthened army / air force cooperation.

By the end of the civil war, Luftwaffe troops served at or near the front line, coordinating strikes on targets between the aircrew overhead and the commanders of both the Luftwaffe and the army further back. As the war came to an end, the Germans walked away from their victory with a solid appreciation for the power of air / ground coordination, although coordination between Luftwaffe units and ground troops still was mostly limited to the Army's Divisional level.

Interestingly, the military observers in Britain came to opposite conclusions. When the Minister of the Army suggested that the value of close air support had been proven by the Germans, the idea was squashed by senior officials as inefficient and ineffective. Official memos strongly discouraged the mere talk of coordinating air power with the army below. It became so dogmatic that in 1938, any RAF unit practicing strafing in cooperation with the army got a letter of rebuke from the Air Ministry.

British and French soldiers and airmen would pay for their leader's stubbornness in the years to come. Germany was going to take the lessons learned in Spain and focus their attention next on Poland. The West would sit back and watch. The fuse to WWII had been lit.

spainvonrichthofen(bol).jpg (81045 bytes)

Return from Spain: Wolfram von Richthofen (left)
is greeted by Generalfeldmarschall Goering
Source: The Birth of the Luftwaffe

The German Army that crossed into Poland on September 1 had with it more than 200 Ju87s for support, and the years between the Spanish Civil War and the Poland invasion provided now-General Richthofen with time to experiment with new techniques for controlling close air support missions.

polandstukatakeoff(bol).jpg (65752 bytes)

Stukas taking off for first wave of strikes, Sept 1, 1939
Source: The Birth of the Luftwaffe

Named the "air commander for special purposes," his main contribution to the development of CAS was the creation of four Special Air Detachments. Traveling with army division commanders and using armored cars, these units were sent to General von Reichenau's Tenth Army to experiment calling in precision air strikes.

When not being used for direct support work, Stukas were used throughout the campaign to attack bridges, fortifications, and other "hard" targets. Some early lessons in the vulnerability of the Stuka operating alone could have been taught had the Poles used a unified, coherent command for their air force. They did not. Contrary to most reports, the Polish Air Force was NOT destroyed on the ground in the first day, but rather sent to dispersal fields, where interaction with larger air units was difficult at best. The Polish Air Force was therefore unable to stop the widespread attacks by the Stukas as they protected the German army's flanks and blasted targets at or near front lines. While the attack on Poland is often considered the first real Blitzkrieg, it was a far more traditional attack. Points of resistance were simply bypassed, trading distance for all else. Air power preserved the flanks of the German advances and froze Polish units, who usually found themselves surrounded by the German army in large pockets.

When the Polish Army finally launched a major counteroffensive on the flanks of the fast-moving German army, they became early martyrs to the effectiveness of airpower. On September 9, about 170,000 Polish forces gathered and attacked German forces near Poznan. The attack briefly looked like it would work, cutting the 10^th Army off from its logistics trail.

Unfortunately for the Poles, the 10^th was the unit with von Richthofen's Special Air Detachments. Quickly, the attacking Poles found themselves under withering dive-bombing from Stukas and constant strafing by Hs123 biplanes (the Hs123 was the German's premier ground attack strafer for the first several years of the war). However, it wasn't just the dive bomber and ground attack assets of the Luftwaffe that were used. Any available aircraft in the theater was sent to plug the gap. Horses, still crucial to both Polish and German ground forces, panicked under the air attacks; their troops did little better. Stukas had been fitted with sirens on their wings, and the Hs123's engine sounded like a loud machine gun itself at low altitude. The effect on the fresh Polish troops, who had never come under air attack, was total. It was an utter route, and 1,700 sorties later, the Luftwaffe has effectively crushed the Polish counterattack.

"Towards ten o'clock, a furious air assault was made on the river crossings near Witkovice - which for the number of aircraft engaged, the violence of their attack, and the acrobatic daring of their pilots, must have been unprecedented. Every moment, every troop concentration, every line of advance, came under pulverizing bombardment from the air. It was just hell on earth. The bridges were destroyed, the fords blocked, and the waiting columns of men decimated."

Terry Hadler's painting of a Stuka attack, Sept 4, 1939
Source: Duel for the Sky

Although the battle for Poland was handily won by the Germans, air power theorists such as von Richthofen still saw much room for improvement. A wide range of issues had arisen from the actual application of the theory of the Special Air Attachments. Army officers didn't feel the need to call in air strikes as much as they could have, and there were the inevitable SNAFUs of radio frequencies and target identification. The fact that the Polish campaign really was more a battle of encirclement rather than a true concentrated armor attack also weighed heavily. Largely free of concentrated attacks, the Stukas were used to protect the flanks of German units and strike point targets.

As the battle for Poland effectively ended on September 17, the Luftwaffe had to take its lesson to heart. Despite the overall success, losses were not light. In the three weeks of battle, Luftwaffe losses climbed to about 18 percent. Out of the 285 aircraft lost, however, only 31 had been Stukas. Comparatively, the Polish Air Force lost more than 80 percent of their aircraft, and 30 percent of its aircrew, in the first two weeks. It was a convincing win that blinded the Germans to some problems with their CAS strategies, but which fueled further development of solid tactics.

In contrast to Poland, the attack on France in May, 1940 was a better illustration of CAS in a Blitzkrieg-style armored attack. Using the time between Poland and France to hone skills, develop strategy, and ready their forces, the Germans proceeded to embarrass their opponents, nations with militaries that were arguably as good, if not better, than the Germans in many areas.

As the Germans conquered Norway and Denmark, the Allies placed their faith on a strategy that would fail them during the inevitable attacks on Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. On May 10, the expected German attacks came on the Low Countries, in the form of airborne and air-landed assaults. The British and French had essentially predicted this attack, and moved their forces rapidly from northeast France to counter the attack, sure that the fortified Magniot Line and the dense Ardennes Forest protected their right flank from any German counterattack. As they moved, they came under surprisingly light air attack from the Germans. The Allies took this as a sign of weakness and wholly expected to block any further German advance.

It was, therefore, a bit of a shock when 1,800 German tanks, from seven divisions, emerged out of the "unpassable" Ardennes across a 50-mile wide front. An umbrella of airpower lashed out at the French and British air bases and far behind the front lines, using twin-engine bombers to attack communication lines, logistics center, and other key targets. Closer to the actual ground units, Stukas provided a rolling wave of support as the Germans raced out of the Ardennes and towards the River Meuse.

German observation plane circles over armored column.
Photo believed to have been taken by General Erwin Rommel
Source: Blitzkrieg

The attacks to the north were essentially a diversion for the knockout punch, which now not only threatened to trap the Allies to the north, but cut a wide path through Northern France to the English Channel. Supporting those tanks were more than 300 Stukas and over 40 Hs123s, attacking targets in front of the massive armored attack. Deeper into France, Bf110s, Ju-88s, and other German aircraft hit Allied airfields, communications centers, and other key targets in raids designed to make the opponent off balance and impotent.

Within two days, the German armored thrust had reached the Meuse River and all eyes were on the city of Sedan, where a crucial French strongpoint was charged with preventing a crossing. The French commanders at Sedan, caught by surprise at the sight of the German forces massing against the opposite edge of the river, now expected a long delay as German artillery, often still drawn by horse, caught up with the fast-moving armored units. They correctly assumed that they had more artillery assets at their disposal, but incorrectly assumed the Germans would hold off their attack until their own artillery caught up. What they didn't know or understand was that the Luftwaffe, and especially the Stuka, were being transformed into another roll…on-call aerial artillery.

As the first German units crossed the river in boats on May 13, the French defenders were subjected to massive dive-bombing attacks on their fortified positions. As the French used their artillery against the attackers, it was targeted and destroyed by German air units. Once freed of their direct supporting role, the Stukas were reassigned to attack any reinforcements heading to Sedan.

francerivercrossing(bl).jpg (91798 bytes)

German forces practicing a river crossing.
General Rommel is circled.
Source: Blitzkrieg

Stunning the world and the French philosophy of a strong river defense, by May 14 German tanks were crossing the river and racing to the northwest, cutting off the Allied forces now stretched out in the flat land between the armor and the German airborne attackers in the countries to the north. The German tanks' freedom from threats was due largely to the Luftwaffe and the incompetence of their opponents.

Despite the success of the German attack, some problems remained in the implementation of air / ground coordination. The rapid pace of the attack made fixed "bomb lines," which clearly identified friendly and enemy positions, obsolete. Supply lines were greatly stretched, and aircrews were deeply strained. Some pilots flew nine sorties per day supporting the attacks. And while it had been enhanced, radio communication between the ground and the air sometimes still left much to be desired.

"Target description by telephone, based on maps, was used. This of course causes quite a bit of delay, which was not acceptable for a quick operation. Beginning in France, therefore, a special organization was set up. A Stuka UHF wireless set was mounted in a tank of the Panzer Force involved in the main battle. Luftwaffe UHF operators in these tanks participated in the main ground attacks, as close as possible to the commander of the Panzer Force. Where this system was in operation, the Stuka unit was directed overhead and got exact targeting by wireless. In addition, the ground troops would shoot colored flares near the target."

The use of flares became important to identify enemy from friendly. Operating behind the rapidly-dissolving Allied lines, Stuka crews would use flares to request identification from unknown vehicles below. German ground troops spotting a Stuka overhead firing flares would respond in kind. Flare colors would change every few days to prevent the Allies from learning the tactic. Other attempts at providing targeting information included large flags laid on the ground with an arrow on them, pointing in the direction of the main enemy resistance, as well as German flags laid on top of German forward vehicles. The problem of friendly fire was a new hazard of bombing close to your own army, and while the techniques of the Germans seem primitive, the 50+ years since the war haven't particularly seen much improvement in identifying friend from foe from the air.

Unlike Poland, where the Germans essentially enveloped spots of heavy resistance and bypassed likely points of heavy combat, in France, they directed massive aerial firepower at the "Schwerpunkt," or vital points where the German commander focuses his attack (usually sources of heavy enemy resistance). The effects of the Stukas, sirens screaming as they fell from the sky onto the unbloodied Allied forces, was devastating.

One officer in the British Expeditionary Force described the aftermath of a Stuka attack on an infantry unit, which suffered very little in physical casualties from the attack.

"The chaps were absolutely shattered. I think afterwards the officers and few sergeants got up and tried to get things moving, but the chaps just sat about in a complete daze, and one had to almost kick them to get them moving to the next position…on this first occasion, the effect [of the Stukas] was truly fantastic."

"The incessant howling of the dive bombers, the scream of their bombs, and the endless explosions, accompanied by blinding smoke and the shrieks of the wounded, would have strained the nerves of hard-bitten regulars, let alone those of the middle-aged and rather unwilling soldiers who thought only of returning to their families. For the infantry, covering in trenches and bunkers, it was an ordeal that produced deep shock, but for the artillery in their wider gun pits, it was infinitely worse."

Germany's Air Manual 16, which set much of the underlying strategy of the Blitzkrieg, had long identified the morale effects of a dive-bombing attack to be often much greater than the actual physical damage done. Those theories now seemed solidly proven. The Allied defenses had shattered in the face of the rapid German advance and the ceaseless pummeling from above. Defending Allied troops simply just broke and ran to the rear, under constant air attack from the Luftwaffe.

However, the Germans did not get off entirely without loss. In addition to losing one of their longtime and much-admired Stuka pilots to flak on May 12, the Germans also learned a valuable lesson in the vulnerability of their primary weapon, the Stuka. While Allied air missions against the German attack were at best weak and at worst disastrous, the Allies did occasionally get lucky. On May 12, French pilots flying Curtis Hawk 75 fighters intercepted a returning flight of 12 Stukas without an escort. They shot down all of them without loss, and then proceeded to cause an inbound flight of Stukas to drop their bombs early and head for cover. Several more were shot down, again without French loss. The lesson that Stukas could not survive alone in airspace actively defended by airplanes was one that the Germans would forget and learn again later over Britain in the summer of 1940.

In general, though, Allied aircraft committed to attacking the Germans was slaughtered wholesale by flak and air defenses. Because CAS was so de-emphasized by the Allied air forces, their attacks came in fat, dumb, and happy. On May 14, 40 out of the 72 attacking British Battle and Blenheim bombers were shot down. On May 17, only one aircraft in an attacking force of twelve from Britain's 82 Squadron returned to base. By May 12, the RAF had lost 63 of its original 135 aircraft in the area. Daily losses ranged from 40 to 60 percent, and on Saturday May 11, the RAF took 100 percent losses in its attacks. Which side had spent the lull between Poland and France practicing air to ground attacks was painfully obvious.

As the Germans raced to the sea to cut off the Allies, several attempts were made to strike at the German flanks. At Marle and Montcornet on May 17, Arras on May 21, and Cambrai on May 22, the attacks were too little, too late. Airpower isolated the attacking units and punished them severely, often before their attacks ever started. Once in contact with German ground units, the attacking Allies found themselves outgunned and alone. The decision to start using the German 8.8cm anti-aircraft gun in an anti-tank role helped seal the fate of the poorly-planned Allied attacks.

By early June, the British were pinned at Dunkirk, trying to rescue what remained of their once-mighty expeditionary force. While German close air support certainly cannot take the entire credit for the Allied defeat, it was a major contributor and shocked the world.

The Luftwaffe that was flung against the massive Soviet military machine in July 1941 was not, fundamentally, all that different from the one that had been used some successfully against Poland, France, and the Low Countries. More than 2/3 of the entire Luftwaffe was thrown into the battle, 2,700 aircraft in total. In sheer numbers, it wasn't a much larger force than the one which had crushed the earlier countries, and, at least at the onset, the success was just as total.

Striking Soviet airbases, the Luftwaffe destroyed more than 1,800 Soviet aircraft, all but about 300 as they sat on the ground. Those that did manage to take off were piloted by crews from the VVS (Soviet Air Force), which had seen its ranks gutted by Stalin. The German air to air kill ratio was astounding. Some pilots quickly racked up over 100 kills, and Erich Hartmann ended the war with an astounding 352, most on the Russian front.

In the realm of close air support, the success was also growing beyond the expectations of even airpower theorists. Stukas rolled in ahead of advancing Panzer units as they sliced their way through the vast space of the Soviet empire. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops were cut off, defeated, and surrendered. Even aircraft not designed for the rigors of low level combat, like the He111 and Ju88 bombers, were used to strafe and attack Soviets where they could.

SD-2 anti-personnel / cluster bomblets dropping onto a
Russian airfield during low-level attack
Source: Spearhead for Blitzkrieg

Many refinements were made to the tactics of the attackers, learned from their campaigns in France and Poland. Many more of the UHF teams that had so effectively coordinated strikes were sent into Russia, formed mostly of Luftwaffe Signal Corps troops, but also some with actual Stuka pilots on rotation. Although it is hard to find specific references to such, it is inferred in many text that they operated closer to the front lines as well, becoming more forward air controllers than coordinators with the Panzer Generals. In the fast-moving war, it was soon found that close communication with ground commanders was key to success, and as the attack wore on, more and more of the Stuka pilots were rotated back to flying positions, leaving the task at the hands of the Signal Corps UHF operators, who often were better at the communication task anyway. There were never enough of these units to meet the needs of the army, but they stayed close to the Stuka units as they were shifted up and down to the many battles of the Eastern Front.

As August rolled around, some troubling new developments began to be noticed by German commanders…..the Soviets kept coming. No matter how successful their attacks, their opponent never seemed to run out of men or material. One pre-invasion German intelligence estimate put the Soviet army at a strength of about 200 divisions…by August, they had already counted 360, with no end in sight.

There were some troubling new developments for the Luftwaffe, too. The Soviet "scorched earth" policy left little in the way of shelter as they retreated. German Luftwaffe commanders, used to deploying right with their Wehrmacht counterparts, often found no shelter adequate to set up shop and coordinate attacks. Stuka pilots who had so successfully struck fixed French and Polish sites, and who destroyed the soft targets in the West, now found Soviet armor a tougher nut to crack. Not all of the existing weapons worked anymore; even early in the campaign, some new weapons were obviously needed. On the fourth day of the initial invasion, for instance, a force of 36 Stukas tried divebombing a large formation of Soviet armor, scoring only one kill…the fragmentation bombs that had worked so well in France proved too weak for the tougher Soviet tanks.

The weather started to play a larger factor as well…Stuka dive bombing attacks needed about a minimum of 2,800 feet cloud ceiling…the weather often forced the attackers lower than they would have liked, and losses mounted. New ground attack variations of aircraft, such as the FW190 fighter, were used to supplement the Stukas with shallow diving attacks, but did not have the same accuracy dropping bombs as their dive-bombing counterparts. They were, however, faster and more capable of defending themselves, which became more and more important, because the VVS and its infrastructure was starting to show its teeth. The Soviet dismantled much of their aviation industry, more than 1,500 production facilities, ahead of the German advance and moved it brick by brick beyond reach of German airpower (the Germans never developed an effective long range bomber). So while the Germans were continuing a wide victory over the Soviets, the Soviet aircraft industry could produce more aircraft faster. The German air units were essentially being bled dry. There was no rotation policy…pilots flew until they died or the war ended. Even at the loss rate of 16 aircraft a day, the Germans were being slowly ground to a halt the deeper and deeper they pressed east.

Stukas taking off from snow-covered airstrip
Source: The Great Book of World War II Airplanes

This became evident in the use of CAS airpower as well as the supports to make it work. Dive bomber pilots routinely flew over a dozen sorties per day, often only a half-hour a duration. Ground crews (called "blackbirds") salvaged what they could, but a lack of spare parts often meant aircraft were simply left behind as units and their crews moved to a new forward operating base. The German philosophy of Schwerpunkt started to fail because there were dozens, if not hundreds, of 'Schwerpunkten' along the 1,000 mile-long front.

In October, Hitler decided to launch an all-out push for the prize: Moscow. The initial attacks, called Operation Typhoon, were a large success. Resupplied during a six-week period, German Stukas and Panzers raced forward throughout October and November with the same success seen time and time before.

Then "General Mud" struck, and Hitler made a costly mistake. Torrential rains in November turned the land into a sea of mud, slowing the advance to a crawl. New demands for airpower in the Mediterranean theater caused Hitler to transfer Luftflotte 2 and its 1,300 aircraft to Italy to support that front. Those units had been providing support to Operation Typhoon, and faced with an early, harsher than normal winter, the German army that was within 19 miles of Moscow was finally ground to a halt.

At the same time, the VVS regained its momentum. In the battle for Moscow's suburbs, the Soviets flew more than 50,000 sorties, the vast majority of them CAS missions. This was five times what the Germans could put forward. Of the Luftwaffe's 100,000 vehicles in Russia, only about 15 percent were operational. Operational strength of Luftwaffe combat units plunged…aircraft wouldn't start in the cold and exposed forward bases, equipment froze, and the limited number of hot air blowers were used to keep tools from freezing to mechanics' hands. By January, there were less than 500 operational German aircraft in the entire Russian front…the Soviets had 1,000 in the Moscow area alone.

As the Germans retreated and winter came and went, the Luftwaffe was slowly built back up to a strength of around 2,700 planes. Hitler's decision to launch a southern counterattack in the summer of 1942 saw the Luftwaffe again being pressed into action to provide CAS to advancing German troops. Again, the pairing worked well, and the Germans found themselves sweeping through large amounts of Russian land. However, this time the Germans found Soviet resistance fairly weak…ground attack and dive bomber units often had no CAS work to do, and were sent into the enemy's rear to attack targets behind enemy lines.

The Russians let them come and when the Germans became bogged down in Stalingrad, the Russians closed the noose and cut off the German troops. Despite massive Luftwaffe attempts at resupply, it was a losing battle for the Germans. When they finally surrendered in January, 1943, the Germans and their allies had suffered more than 500,000 casualties.

However, in some ways the defeat at Stalingrad had helped the Luftwaffe. Now freed from the single-minded duty of supporting their trapped army, they rebuilt their strength, incorporated new units and aircraft types, and re-allocated their ground attack pilots. General von Richthofen, who had opposed the massive airlift into Stalingrad, consolidated and reorganized Luftwaffe operations in the south under one command. As part of the reorganization, units performing below par had their personnel shipped back to Germany for more training, while more battle-experienced crews took their place.

Although the final outcome of the larger air war was essentially decided by this time in the war, the Luftwaffe was not done yet. A new German offensive in February 1943 flew right into the face of the much larger Soviet Air Force and quickly recaptured several key cities. Using tried and true Blitzkrieg tactics, the Stukas, and increasingly, ground attack versions of the FW-190, rolled in ahead of advancing German forces, responding to threats on command and also interdicting supply lines behind the front.

But time was not on the German's side. Although the Luftwaffe reached its peak size in June of 1943 (6,000 aircraft), only about one third of those could be allocated for the Eastern Front. The Russians just had to focus on one front, and their numerical superiority soon also was bolstered by more and more tactical superiority.

Viewing the dire situation at hand, Hitler pressed for one final strike. The final straw between the two armies came at a small city named Kursk.

It was Hitler's hope that a surprise offensive, led by the army's new Panther tanks, would cut off a large section of the Russian army and pre-empt any planes they had at mounting a large summer offensive.

Aviation historian Walter Boyne called Kursk "a titanic struggle," and it's hard to argue with him. The battle involved more than 2 million men, 5,000 aircraft, and 6,000 tanks from the two sides. Both air forces threw their best and brightest new designs and theories into the mix. And it was here that the two sides unveiled some new weapons that, at least in function, are still cornerstones of anti-armor CAS today.

On the German side, one innovation came in the form of a new aircraft, the Hs129, a twin-engine, armored ground attack plane that could mount up to a 75mm cannon and which would close to within 500 meters of an enemy tank before firing the massive round at the target. Although it could only carry 12 rounds for the cannon, pilots were instructed to fire four-round bursts at the target, with each 25 lb. shell offering a devastating punch if it hit. Only about 25 of the 75mm Hs129s were built, however; the vast majority of the fleet was equipped with 20mm, 30mm, or 37mm cannon. And the Hs129 never lived up to its billing; it was barely faster than the Stuka, was not maneuverable, and suffered from poor engines that really limited the operational effectiveness of the aircraft. In the end, only a handful of Hs129s were in service at any one time. In one of the larger Hs129 attacks, 16 aircraft, supported by ground attack FW-190F, attacked a large formation of Soviet armor near Belgordo. As the -190s dropped cluster munitions on the soft targets, the -129s rolled onto the tanks and fired their 30mm cannon into the targets. An hour later, more than 50 tanks had been destroyed.

The Luftwaffe placed great hope in the Hs129, but at Kursk, the old standby…the Stuka…really was the plane to show its ability to adapt to yet another role. First Lieutenant Hans-Ulrich Rudel, already famous for sinking the Soviet battleship Marat with a Stuka in 1941, made an even bigger reputation for himself at Kursk flying an experimental variant of the Stuka carrying twin 37mm cannon in underwing pods. He had been involved in the development of the weapon system and tactics at a German research facility, and put it to first use in the Black Sea, shooting at Russian landing craft (he is credited with 70 landing craft kills). Over Russia, Rudel knocked out scores of enemy tanks, including 12 T-34 tanks in one day. With their dive brakes removed, the cannon-armed Stukas would swoop in from behind attacking Soviet armor, attacking at near ground level (15-25 ft AGL) and firing their tungsten-tipped 37mm rounds into the rear and top of the tanks. As the G model Stukas pressed home their low level anti-armor missions, older D model Stuka would divebomb anti-aircraft units threatening the tank killers. Rudel describes one such attack by adding "...[my rear gunner] said that the tank exploded like a bomb and he had seen bits of it crashing down behind us."

37mm-armed Ju-87G-1 coming in for landing.
Emblem on engine indicates Rudel's unit.
Source: The Great Book of World War II Airplanes

Ground crew loading six-round clip into 37mm.
Each cannon carried two such magazines.
Source: The Great Book of World War II Airplanes

An aside on Rudel….by the end of the war, he had amassed an astounding reputation as the top Stuka pilot, finishing the war with more than 2,500 sorties, and credit for the destruction of 519 tanks, one battleship, one cruiser, one destroyer, 70 landing craft, four armored trains, and nine enemy aircraft…all in an aircraft judged by some to be obsolete by the start of the war. He was shot down 30 times by ground fire (never by another aircraft) and was wounded five times, including one instance where he lost his leg…and continued flying with an artificial one! The Soviets put a 100,000 ruble bounty on his head, dead or alive.

However, for all of Rudel's (and the other Luftwaffe pilots') effort, the battle for Kursk proved a bitter defeat for the Germans. Tipped off to the attack, the Russians planned multi-level defenses, heavily mined the area, and wore the German army down to a breaking point. When it was all said and done on July 11, the world had seen the largest armor battle in history, and the ultimate end of German offensive operations in World War Two.

From Kursk on, the focus of the Luftwaffe was to play defense, attempting to beat back the attacking swarms of Russian units that lunged deeper and deeper into German territory.

Anyone studying the role of close air support in the German armed forces of WWII can't help but walk away in awe at the size and scope of what was attempted. From their fledgling beginning to the stunning victories in Poland and France, to the massive Eastern Front, the Germans redefined the role that aircraft played in war. Many of the lessons learned by the Luftwaffe still ring true today, and other countries have, along the way, shown as much an ability to forget the lessons as the British, French, and Poles did in the war.

Success in CAS depends on a number of factors…the proper aircraft with properly trained crew being directed and coordinated by skilled observers, with the full support of the ground units they are supporting. When the Germans had that situation, their concept of attack potential of aircraft left their opponents reeling. When they forgot those components themselves, their crew suffered. It is fair to summarize the lessons in several points:

It's ironic that in the end, the Germans were defeated in CAS and everything else by their lack of focus on the strategic Schwerpunkt, especially when that concept, tactically, was what made their CAS so successful. By bleeding their resources on numerous fronts, the Germans were never able to throw their full weight at one opponent and sustain it.

Any hope that their initial success would be ignored by the Allies also proved fruitless in the end. The Allies quickly recovered from their embarrassing initial humbling defeats at the hands of the Germans, and in the end, beat them at their own game. In 1944 and 1945, it was the Wehrmacht and the Luftwaffe on the run, never again to mount an offensive in significant numbers enough to change the outcome of the war. The most destructive war in history ended with, among many other lessons, the concept that airpower can have a devastating effect on the enemy when used to its fullest potential. May we never have to learn or unlearn that lesson ever again.

THE AIRCRAFT
Although virtually every airframe in the Luftwaffe was used in CAS roles at some point in the war, four models especially "pulled their weight." Below are some basic statistics for each type.

hs123(e).jpg (53478 bytes)
Source: The Encyclopedia of Weapons of World War II

Stats for Hs123a-1
Powerplant: One 880 hp BMW 132Dc Radial piston engine
Max Speed: 211 mph at 3,935 ft
Cruising Speed: 196 mph at 6,560 ft
Service Ceiling: 29,530 ft
Range: 531 miles
Armament: 2 x 7.92mm MG17 machine guns, plus up to 992 lb of bombs

Ju-87G-1
Source: The Great Book of World War II Airplanes

Stats for Ju-87D-1
Powerplant: One 1,400 hp Junkers Jumo 211J-1 inverted-vee piston engine
Max Speed: 255 mph at 12,600 ft
Cruising Speed: 199 mph at 16,700 ft
Service Ceiling: 23,915 ft
Range: 954 miles
Armament: 2 x 7.92mm MG17 machine guns in wings and twin 7.92mm machine guns in rear cockpit, plus maximum bombload of one 3,968 lb bomb under fuselage, or various loads underneath fuselage and wings

THE WEAPONS
The Germans used a wide range of weapons throughout the war for CAS, ranging from basic dumb bombs to cluster submunitions and high-velocity cannon. As they did throughout the war in other areas, they also developed some technically-advanced-but-troubled experimental weapons. A brief summary.

Guns / Cannon
A large range of guns and cannon were carried in an even larger range of platforms throughout the war. Because of its use in the Ju-87G-1, below are some statistics for the 37mm anti-tank cannon. Also included are stats on the 30mm MK103 cannon, which was used for both air-to-air and air-to-ground roles in the FW-190.

Ju-87G-1's 37mm BK3.7 (Flak 18) anti-tank cannon Source: The Great Book of World War II Airplanes	BG3.7 (Flak 18) 37mm Anti-Tank Cannon Weight of weapon: 272 kg (600 lb) Length of weapon: 3626 mm (11 ft, 10.75 in) Length of barrel: 2112 mm (6 ft, 11.75 in) Muzzle Velocity: 795-860 m/sec (2610-2820 fps) Rate of Fire: 140 rds/min Effective Range: 2000m Weight of round: 3.22 lb (AP-T, tungsten-carbide core), 3.12 lb (HE-T)
	MK103 30mm cannon Weight of weapon: 145 kg Length of weapon: 2335 mm Muzzle Velocity: 940 m/sec (HE/AP tracer) Rate of Fire: 380 rds/min (HE/AP tracer) Penetration: 110 mm armor plate at 300m

A large array of bombs were used by the Luftwaffe. At the start of the war, the most common fragmentation bombs were the SD-10 (22 lbs.) and SD-50 (110 lbs.). As the war progressed, it became apparent that there was a need for an area-saturation fragmentation weapon, rather than the earlier models that more or less required an accurate drop. The SD-2 was procured and mass-produced, and at the start of the Russian campaign was in widespread use. Initially, the bomblets were hung individually on aircraft (the Bf-109 and Ju-87, for instance, could carry 96 of them), but time went on, a plywood dispenser container was created and used by many airframes. In the largest size used, these plywood containers could carry up to 248 of the SD-2 bomblets. A low-level profile was needed for accurate drops, which became increasingly difficult due to ground fire. Of more use on the front was the SD-1 bomblet, which at 2.2 lbs offered a larger spread for the same size dispenser. With the design of a popular new dispenser, the AB250, this bomb case could be more accurately dropped in more profiles and would release about 225 SD-1s.

For attacking armor, however, both the SD-1 and 2 were ineffective. After discovering that conventional bombs often were ineffective at scoring hits on moving or dispersed armor, the Germans introduced the 8.8 lb SD-4HI cluster bomblet, which had a hollow charge warhead that could penetrate as much as five inches of armor. As many as 78 SD-4HIs were packed into 1,100 lb containers and were used heavily by Ju-87 Stukas, which had the means to accurately drop them in steep dives. Larger 550 lb hollow charge bombs were used against fortifications, and they allowed up to 10 ft of armor penetration against concrete fortifications.

General purpose bombs tended to be either the SC-10 (22 lb), SC-50 (110 lb), or SC-250 (550 lb), sometimes fitted with long spikes on their nose to attack raillines and roads. Some of the spiked bombs could be dropped from as low as 160 ft AGL and proved useful in that role.

Although the Germans ended up favoring the high-velocity cannon and cluster bomblets for CAS work later in the war, a wide number of trials were made with unguided rockets and experimental weapons, almost exclusively against the Russians. The primary testbed for most of these weapons was the FW-190 airframe, as it replaced the Stuka in service and was a more survivable platform on the Eastern Front. In addition to glider bombs and rocket torpedoes (mostly for anti-ship work), the FW-190 also could carry the Panzerblitz 2 anti-tank rockets, which were variations of the R4M rockets used against Allied bombers. These rockets were launched in salvos of six against enemy tanks. The earlier Panzerschreck project involved using three modified 88mm rockets, which was then updated with larger warheads and modified launch rails. Lastly, the anti-bomber 280mm Wfr.Gr. 28/32 rocket was also experimented with, with little success.

The Luftwaffe also experimented with vertically-mounted weapons, designed to fire down onto the thin top armor of Soviet tanks. First attempted with the 30mm MK103 cannon, the experimentation reached its peak with the SG113 (pictured above), which was two 77mm cannons mounted vertically on each wing. A magnetic sensor on the bottom of the installation would detect a tank below, and all four would fire at once. To counter the recoil, counterweights were fired upwards at the same time. The system successfully passed evaluation, but never made it into combat.

Without turning this into an Academy Awards speech, there are some people whom I'd like to thank for their help during the writing of this article.......

Andy Bush, for first proposing this CAS series back in October 1999 and for continuing to push me to finish this article. Couldn't have done it without ya, Andy.

The other guys at SimHQ.com, who helped proofread it and gave me some great feedback.

The members of the Aircraft List and the Panzer Elite Alpha/Beta Testing List, who sent me in some good directions when looking for source material.

SimHQ.com Reader Robert Murphy, who really helped with historical fact-checking and who has never been shy about telling me his opinions. ;) Any errors in the article are mine, not his.

SimHQ.com Reader and fellow Panzer Elite Beta Tester Thomas Cofield, who gave me some great info and who also pointed me in some good directions. Any errors in the article are mine, not his.

The taxpayers of three local towns for lending me books out of their libraries for months at a time, and whom I hope to pay back in the form of a $1.3 million overdue book fee. ;)

And, of course, my wife, for putting up with a larger-than-normal stack of history/aviation books on the coffee table for five months.

Bishop, Chris (Ed.), The Encyclopedia of Weapons of World War II, Barnes and Noble Books, 1998. ISBN 0-7607-1022-8.

Boyne, Walter J., Clash of Wings: Air Power in World War II, Simon and Schuster, 1994. ISBN 0-671-79370-5.

Clancy, Tom, Airborne: A Guided Tour of an Airborne Task Force, Berkley Books, 1997. ISBN 0-425-15770-9.

Deighton, Len, Blitzkrieg: From the Rise of Hitler to the Fall of Dunkirk, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1979.

Deighton, Len, Blood, Tears, and Folly: An Objective Look at World War II, Pluriform Publishing, 1993. ISBN 0-06-017000-X.

Deichmann, General der Flieger Paul; Price, Alfred (Editor), Spearhead for Blitzkrieg: Luftwaffe Operations in Support of the Army 1939-1945, Ballantine Publishing Group, 1996 ISBN 0-8041-1695-4.

Grinsell, Robert, Focke-Wulf Fw190 (Part of "The Great Book of World War II Airplanes"), Bonanza Books, 1984. ISBN 0-517-459930.

Grinsell, Robert, Messerschmitt Bf109 (Part of "The Great Book of World War II Airplanes"), Bonanza Books, 1984. ISBN 0-517-459930.

Schliephake, Hanfried, The Birth of the Luftwaffe, Henry Regnery Company, 1971. LOC 72-80940.

Smith, Peter, Close Air Support: An Illustrated History, 1914 to the Present, Orion Books, 1990. ISBN 0-517-56907-8.

Vanags-Baginskis, Alex, Stuka Ju-87 (Part of "The Great Book of World War II Airplanes"), Bonanza Books, 1984. ISBN 0-517-459930.

Wernick, Robert, Blitzkrieg (Time-Life Books World War II Series), Time-Life Books, Inc., 1977. ISBN 0-8094-2456-8.